The purpose of the present note is to advertise an interesting conjecture concerning a well-known translation in modal logic, by confirming a (highly restricted) special case of the conjecture.
1 Considerations from the Kripke semantics point in a similar direction, but since these have proved suggestive rather than conclusive for us to date, they will not be in play explicitly in what follows. The idea is that whenever A is not KT-provable, the reflexive closures of frames on which A is valid will validate some formulas-the A* of the proof of Corollary 4 below-not valid on every reflexive frame. Note that we do not say that A is valid on a frame if and only if A* is valid on its reflexive closure-by analogy with the well-known fact that τ (A) is valid on a frame iff A is valid on its reflexive closure. In fact, there can be no function g(¡) from formulas to formulas with the property that for all formulas A, A is valid on a frame iff g(A) is valid on its reflexive closure, since different frames with the same reflexive closure need not validate the same formulas. 2 We are taking a normal modal logic to be a set of formulas in the language described above, containing all the theorems of K and closed under Necessitation, Modus Ponens, and Uniform Substitution. For such a logic S we write " S A" for "A P S" and read this as: "A is provable in (or: is a theorem of ) S". Because of the Uniform Substitution condition, it doesn't matter whether we think of KT as the smallest normal modal logic containing the formula 2p 3 p or as the smallest such logic containing all instances of the schema 2A 3 A. Whereas Chellas [1] uses T as the name of the schema, we use it as the name for the formula just mentioned.
of KT is -nonconservative. (Note that the -formulas comprise precisely the image of the translation τ .)
Massaged into the form just given, the conjecture clearly admits of no counterexample in which A is of modal degree 0, since for such an A / P KT, K¨A is the inconsistent logic (as A is then a 2-free formula which is not a two-valued tautology). In the following section, we shall extend this to cover the case of formulas of modal degree 1-formulas, that is, in which no occurrence 2 lies within the scope of another occurrence of 2. (On this convention a formula of modal degree n is also of modal degree n + 1.) Evidently this is a considerable limitation. The normal proper extensions of K axiomatizable by one-variable first degree formulas are precisely KD, KD c , KD!, KT, KT c , KT!, K¨2c and the inconsistent logic. Amongst first-degree formulas considered as axioms by which to extend K without restriction as to the number of variables, the most famous are perhaps those from the infinite sequence of formulas Alt n (n P N) from Segerberg [9] , p. 52. This section concludes with some remarks on the general case, without any restriction as to modal degree. Sometimes when A / P KT, we can see that K¨A is not -conservative because its theorems include τ (A), and K τ (A). Examples include the cases in which A is 4 ( = 2p 3 22p) or B ( = p 3 23p, where 3p is ¬2¬p), or T c ( = p 3 2p). In other cases, K¨A τ (A), such as when A is 2c, 2c ∨ 32c, or D c ( = 3p 3 2p, a minor variant of Segerberg's Alt 1 ); but here it is not hard to find -formulas other than τ (A) which are not K-provable but which are of the form τ (B) for KT-unprovable B. (In the cases just mentioned, take B as T c , 3(2p ∨ 2¬p), and p ∨ 2(p 3 q) ∨ 2(p 3 ¬q), respectively.) The function f described in the following section applies to any first degree A to provide a B with the desired behaviour.
    
In any normal modal logic, a formula A is provably equivalent to a conjunction of disjunctions of formulas of the form ¬B ∨ ¬2C ∨ 2D 1 ∨ ¡ ¡ ¡ ∨ 2D n in which B is 2-free, and for the case of A of modal degree 1, the formulas C, D 1 , . . . , D n are also 2-free; 3 we will write such 'basic disjunctions' in the implicational form:
in which the consequent is understood as c when n = 0 and either or both of the conjuncts in the antecedent may be absent. 4 (If both are, we may think of the antecedent as b or, equivalently, identify the conditional with its consequent.)
Whether or not a given A is a first degree modal formula, if A is written as a conjunction A 1 ∧ ¡ ¡ ¡ ∧ A k with each A i (1 i k) a basic formula (as inset above), we define f(A) to be the conjunction of the formulas f(A i ) where f maps A i , to the formula:
in which s is a propositional variable not occurring in A i (i.e. not occurring in the given B, C, D 1 , . . . , D n ), and the -notation is as explained in Section 1.
So defined, f(A) is not unique, since various different conjunctive normal forms V k i=1 A i of A can make a difference, as well as the choice of s from the countable list of propositional variables (see the opening sentence of Section 1), though the first difference is inconsequential and the second could be ironed out by choosing s for A i as the first p j in that enumeration which does not occur in A i . Rather than making any such moves, however, we can simply take f(A) to denote an arbitrarily selected formula satisfying the defining conditions.
 1 For any formula
Proof: It suffices to observe that where
Proof: As in the proof of Lemma 1, it suffices to check this for each A i . Take A i as above, i.e., as (B ∧ 2C) 3 
Our hypothesis is that this is provable in K, so weakening the " "s in the consequent to simple "2"s, and unpacking the " " in the antecedent (together with some re-arranging), we have:
Since A, and therefore A i , is of modal degree (at most) 1, s ∧ B ∧ C is a 2-free formula, so, using the fact that K is a (fully) modalized logic in the sense of [10] ,
In case (a) we have K B 3 ¬C (after substituting B or b for s), and therefore (since KT 2C 3 C) KT B 3 ¬2C, from which we conclude that KT A i . In case (b) we have, substituting V n i=1 D i for s and simplifying:
Putting these ingredients together settles the conjecture of Section 1 insofar as it bears on first degree formulas:  3 Suppose A is a first degree modal formula not provable in KT. Then K¨A proves some -formula not provable in K.
Proof: Let A be as described. We may choose f(A) as the desired -formula, since it is provable in K¨A, by Lemma 1 (and Modus Ponens), but not provable in K, by Lemma 2 (contraposed).
For the first degree KT-unprovable formulas A listed at the end of Section 1, the formulas B given there as having B provable in K¨A without τ (B) provable in K are minor variations on what the definition of f(A) would deliver.
For example, for the case of A as 2c we gave as a candidate B the formula p 3 2p. Since this A contains no propositional variables, taking s as the first variable not occurring in A means that s is p (alias p 1 ), and f(A) is therefore p 3 (c ∨ p), which is provably equivalent in K to p 3 2p. More generally, since we may have to make substitutions, we can say for the proffered examples of B that B and f(A) are K-interducible in the sense that K¨B = K¨f(A). 5 This happens in the case of A = p 3 2p in which again we gave B as p 3 2p, while f(A) is (p ∧ q) 3 (p ∨ q) and we need to substitute p for q before proceeding further.
Returning to the conjecture as first formulated in Section 1, we have the following:
 4 If S = K¨Γ for a set Γ of first degree formulas and S T KT, then τ does not embed KT faithfully in S.
Proof: Given that S T KT, pick A P Γ KT, and the proof of Theorem 3 shows that f(A) is a -formula in K¨A K. Thus we have (1) K f(A) while (2) S f(A). Since f(A) is a -formula, replacing every in f(A) with 2 gives a formula A* for which f(A) = τ (A*), and (1) and (2) can be reformulated as
. From the fact (recalled in Section 1) that τ embeds KT in K, we infer from (1 H ) that KT A*. If it were also the case that τ faithfully embedded KT in S, (2 H ) would imply that KT A*: a contradiction.
What is wanted, then, is a way of lifting the restriction to first degree formulas from Theorem 3 (and Corollary 4)-or else of showing, with a counterexample, that it cannot be lifted. Should the former turn out to be possible, perhaps the proof of Theorem 3 can be turned into the inductive step of a proof of the desired general result (by induction on the modal degree of formulas); however, we do not currently see how the details of such an argument would go. 5 Indeed, since the rule of necessitation is not required here, we could say more informatively that K + B = K + f(A), where S + Γ is the smallest (not necessarily normal) modal logic extending S and containing all formulas in Γ . In fact, everything said in Lemma 2 about KT applies to the quasi-normal modal logic K + T ( = K [T] 0 from [9] , p. 179), suggesting a variant on Corollary 4 below in which the references to K¨Γ and KT are replaced by references to K + Γ and K + T, the qualification "first degree" is dropped, and reference to τ is replaced by a one to the translation τ 0 , where τ 0 (A) is the result of replacing only the outermost (i.e., not modally embedded) occurrences of 2 in A by . We do not go into this in any detail because of the marginal interest of τ 0 by comparison with τ .
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